Psychological Continuity.

1. The first case of the Psychological Criterion is that of the existence of a ‘soul’, that a purely mental entity, which behaves, for our purpose, in much the same way as the physical body. From Locke “[The self] is that conscious thinking thing, … which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery and so is concerned for it[self] as far as that consciousness extends.” This arbitrarily assigned notion is easily as problematic as that of the continuity of a physical body. Additionally so given that it is, by nature, non-visible. The idea of a ‘soul’ or sense of unifying ‘self-ness’ is characteristic as a supposed solution to the problems of physical continuity discussed above. It is simply not possible for an arbitrarily assigned idea to assist in any truth one to the other. The invention of the ‘self’ aids neither the cause of the physical criterion, nor that of the psychological criterion.

2. A more complex example of the psychological criterion makes reference to our experiences and consequently our memories. Another look at Locke for an example of this idea. In essence his idea stands thus; Memories are the connective components of that which distinguishes the ‘self’. Remote memories are just as connective as recent memories, Their simultaneous presence signifies the existence of a continuous ‘self’. This ‘self’ can be housed in any substance (any physical body). [I will cover briefly the method by which he arrives at this conclusion although it is not vital to my project.]

3. How am I my memories?

P(1) – Experiences which I have had in the past are components of what it is to be ‘me’
P(2) – My memories are mnemonic traces of experiences which I have had in the past
ß (3)
C(4) – The memories of these component experiences confirm my continued existence as an ‘I’

Proposition (1) is clearly an independent statement of fact. We can hold the principle that “experiences are components of what is it to be me” even if we cannot maintain and principles of ‘self’ or unchanging ‘essences’.

4. According to Locke, it is not possible to contradict statement (2) although there is a very simple opposition to this view. I have many apparent memories of things that did not, in fact, happen to me, or, occurred while I was not aware of them. The first conjecture is easily explained, I can have memories of very vivid dreams, for example. There is no doubt that the dream is something I experienced, but the occurrences within it I did not. My memory of, for example building a shed repeatedly in a dream, is not a memory of something that I experienced consciously. It is a memory of a fiction. The latter instance of ‘false’ memory, is typified by the following example. I have an accident, and fall into a coma. It is known that there are various stages to this recovery process. Initially I am fully unconscious, unaware of my surroundings and supported, more often than not, by machines that control my bodily functions. The second stage of recovery is exemplified by my waking, and apparently holding conversations and being aware of my surroundings. During this phase it is known that nearly all short term memory functions are failing. It is possible for me to have conversations that I will not remember moments after the discussion has ended, while during the debate I appear knowledgeable and coherent. This phase is followed by the return of short term mnemonic functions. I can now recall conversations and my part played in them, however I have no memory of the preceding stage. As I recover fully (I shall assume that I do) a friend tells me of conversations we have had while I was in the second phase. Many years later I seem to recall these conversations, however it is not possible for me to truly have any recollection of them. I have no experience of these events, even though they may have occurred to me, and so memory as experience reference is not in effect.

5. In light of this it is no longer possible for us to readily accept the conclusion (4). It is tempting to believe that there is an extra stage to the argument, ready and waiting to be slotted in to place at (3). For example ‘Memories are necessarily linked through time one to the next and so on’ Although this clearly will not do, it is simply not the case. Something as simple as sleeping would break the chain unless it counts that I have a memory of sleep. Although this would be countered by the same reasoning as the objections to (2), in that I ‘fill in’ the gap with a thought that I imagine to be a memory.

And another link that I may find useful for resources.

A short section of text that will become more relavent in my next dissertation post.
extract from John Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding"
Chapter 27

16. Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person. But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended- should it be to ages past- unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw' the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self,- place that self in what substance you please- than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances- I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

17. Self depends on consciousness, not on substance. Self is that conscious thinking thing,- whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not)- which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self: so it is in reference to substances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as every one who reflects will perceive.

‘What we believe ourselves to be.’

Common theories of personal identity are based on principles of continuity. If we are to have an unchanging identity how would this be possible, how would it manifest itself. In essence, we can easily see a continuity in two ways. Physically and psychologically. Physical continuity is simply the notion that we occupy a ‘chunk’ of the three dimensional space that is the world. We move around in it but at no time do we disappear from it. This is the idea of our physical presence in the world, and the continuity of a body that we associate to be ours. Does this hold even if we are sleeping or otherwise unconscious, or if we lose a limb? In answer to the former, yes. The important issue here is the continuity of a body, and secondarily our association to it, we do not disintegrate while we are sleeping, and so our physical continuity is maintained. The latter point is more complicated to decipher. Take as an example an analogy to a broom. The broom consists simply of a handle (a long straight stick) and a head (a bunch of smaller sticks). If either the handle, or the head is lost it would be difficult for us to maintain the presence of the ‘broom’ as a single entity. Now consider the broom to be a compilation of one large stick and a collection of many smaller sticks. In this case, the loss of the handle will still cause the essential loss of the broom, however, a fairly large proportion of the smaller sticks can be lost before the broom is reduced to just a broom handle. Here the presence of the broom as a continuous physical entity is maintained in more circumstances. The final case study to be considered for this analogous case requires the latter definition of a broom (a composite of many small and one large stick). Consider that I require to clean my broom, or put to use all of the smaller sticks in some other task. I now dismantle my broom completely, and perform the task with the smaller sticks. At all times I ensure that no sticks have been lost, and at some point in the future, re-build a broom with the components. Is it still my broom?

Thought for the day, in complete randomness, just to let you know that all sorts of things can be philosophy...

'Does the Welsh scrabble set come with extra L's?'

philosophical explanation in the am.

'The Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

1. Philosophy, the love of knowledge. Anciently the quest for ultimate truth. More modernly, the debate about whether there is ultimate truth at all, and what it would mean for us if there wasn't. My thought for today is a transcript of a lecture I have just attended on "The Two Dogmas of empiricism" by Quine.

2. The first of the dogmas is that of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In this all experience can be expressed in one of two ways, contigently (based on the 'items classified') or necessarily (based on the classifications). Truths about the world as we experience it are contingent, while truths about logic, meaning and language are necessary. Take the statement "all men like meat". This is contingently true upon my sense datum built up into the idea, "men" and my experience of that idea. In this way, the ideas "man" and "meat" are 'items classified' and can produce truth statements by combination with other ideas of sense data. The statement produced in this way is contingent for its truth upon the combination of items. A synthesis of different ideas built up into a generalization about the world. There is a distinction between statements that can be formalized and those which cannot. A formalized statement is of the form "All men are men". This can only be a statement about the way language works, not about the general nature of the world. This leads to an incompatibility of methods of verification (Ayer - 'meaning is the method of verification'). Thus some propositions are true in virtue of their meaning, and some are true in virtue of the way the world is.

3. The second Dogma is more simply the reductionist view of the world. Hume was following this model with statements like "every word stands for an idea" - which is clearly nonsensical. This problem is based from an atomisic perspective in which 'one for one' verification is desired. Think for a moment on Hemples problem, for those unfamiliar it reads thus;
I take the statement 'All swans are white' which can be symbolised as (Vx)Sx -> Wx. Think to truth tables, and specifically the table for (if, then);
p -> q.........p.........q.......result
..................T.........T..........T........(if it is both true that p and q then the statement p -> q is also true)
..................T.........F..........F........(if it is false that q, but true that p the statement p -> q is false)
..................F.........T..........T........(if it is false that p, but true that q the statement p -> q is false)
..................F.........F..........T........(if it is false for both p and q then the statement p -> q is true)
(*this is a standardized table)
The result of this analysis is that the statement 'All swans are white' is confirmed equally convincingly by A) a white swan (T:T case) and B) a brown shoe (F:F case).

4. Quine wishes to offer instead a 'many to many' holistic verification process as an alternative. In addition it is important to note that there is, in all of these cases, a distinction between the sensation (event) and the image (quality) in all discussion about sense data. Many reductionist theories miss this distinction or ignore it, and as such are vague as to which of the aspects their method refers.