Book Review

The Mystery of Consciousness – John R Searle.

Published by Granta Books 1997, 215 pages ( + XVI)

John Searle writes this book as an amalgamation of a series of articles published in The New York Review of Books between 1995 and 1997. He undertakes discussion of six accounts of consciousness theory: Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers and Israel Rosenfield. The discussions range from sympathetic and informative - the case of the first two accounts especially – to abrasive and trivial, in the case of Chalmers particularly. This does not, however, impact on the use of the text as a tool for overview in this ever more complex field of discussion. Searle himself writes his position in the form of a prologue and introduction, and then a final concluding chapter.

The over-arching theme of the book, which comes from Searle, is that consciousness is a biological process. The brain is our medium for having consciousness, and consciousness is a direct product of the brain. This position is problematic in itself, relying heavily on specific definitions of consciousness, which are set down in the introduction as trivial, common sense notions;

‘“consciousness” refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to asleep again, or fall into a coma or die or otherwise become “unconscious”.’

This statement of the ‘common sense’ is typical throughout the work and has the result of giving many of Searle’s more detailed arguments a simple rejoinder. His theories are regularly restatements of an idea that is trivially true on his model of consciousness, relating directly to what becomes his basic theory - ‘consciousness is in the brain’

Despite this logical stasis, and possibly because of it, the works Searle lays down over the course of this short book are demonstrated to be diverse and controversial in the field. The method used throughout the book is to summarise an original work and then discuss the position or ideas in relation to Searle’s own thought. This system works well, and it is supplemented in places by direct exchanges with the philosophers in question. These letters between Dennett/Searle, and Chalmers/Searle, provide an insight into the debate as it currently rages.

Chapter 2, a discussion on Francis Crick contains a well explained account of brain processes and synaptic relations. From the position of ‘consciousness is in the brain’ – which I will call the CB theory from here for simplicity – this account is clearly appealing. The science, while complex, is not overwhelming, and clearly described with diagrams and explanations. There is only a little philosophy in this chapter, as Crick is primarily a scientist. However, this starting section gives the reader a good background to the science of the issues at hand.

Chapter 3 establishes another position based on the structure of the brain. Edelman, according to Searle, thinks that an individual neuron is too small to be the key to consciousness, and as such develops a theory based on groups of neurons. The science is again clear and simplified, with these ideas remaining in clear focus. Put simply groups of neurons send information to each other and in a kind of relay, get a version of that information reflected back at them. It is in this ‘re-entry’ (p41) process that consciousness is based.

Chapter 4 details a position based in mathematics following the method used by Penrose. This chapter, like the one on Crick is technically demanding on the reader. Stated briefly, it contains the ideas of Gödel’s theorem, which states that “ there are statements in mathematical systems which are true, but cannot be proven in those systems.” (p56) and cytoskeletons, which are basically the microscopic building blocks of neurons. The area of interest for Searle here is the distinction between Strong AI (which Searle wants to reject) and Weak AI (which Searle can accept) . Strong AI being the position that ‘the mind is just a computer program. There is nothing else there.” (p9) Weak AI, by contrast, is he view that “the computer is a useful tool for simulations of [..] anything we can describe precisely.” (p9) Weather predictions, cash flows and some brain processes are stated as examples of this phenomena. Gödel’s mathematics is complicated, but is explained well in English. The main aim of this discussion for Penrose is to object that we can even be simulated on computers, the idea of Weak AI. The sections discussed by Searle, on cytoskeletons and clear as he follows Penrose in his task to show that they seem to operate at a quantum level. The main thrust of this chapter is that when we better understand quantum physics and mathematics, we will be able to understand clearly what gives rise to consciousness.

Thus far, Searle has been sympathetic and clear about the ideas of these men. Understandably so, they all (to some degree or another) support his CB theory. However, the debate becomes much more interesting when Searle works thorough the hypotheses of Dennett and Chalmers. At this point, he is working against ideas that are based on a different starting position than the CB theory. In essence, Dennett wants to deny consciousness – as the process which explains qualia (the qualitative states of subjective experience – my pain for one), ‘that special feeling’ [emphasis in original] (p118). In Chapter 5 Searle’s unmoving position becomes more pronounced. In arguing with Dennett on his radically different approach, the principles that give rise to the idea that ‘consciousness is in the brain’ begin to show more clearly as lacking. Statements that are designed to be the final word [ “If is consciously seems to me that I am conscious then I am conscious” (p122) for example] sit starkly against this more distinct background.

In chapter 6, Searle undertakes a brief history of the debate over consciousness. Starting with Cartesian Dualism (the view that everything can be split into two parts, the mental – a soul – and the physical – a body), moving swiftly through Materialism (consciousness should be explained by reducing it to the physical – beliefs are just states of the brain) and Behaviorism (there is nothing but pains, beliefs and actions and consciousness should be explained in terms these things), and finally settling on Functionalism (see below). This is the starting point for his discussion of Chalmers, who in his book The Conscious Mind augments Functionalism with the theory that consciousness can be added on as something out with the main system. Functionalism is the theory that combines (at least in principle) the least problematic components of Behaviorism and Materialism. However, ordinarily this idea has needed to deny the reducibility of consciousness to be practical. Chalmers does not seem to worry about this, and merely adds in consciousness as a periphery to the system, which according to Searle, makes him a Functional Duelist – and puts him right back at the original problem.

Rather than attempting to solve this quandary, Searle re-applies his idea ‘consciousness is in the brain’ to see if it will stick. Unsurprisingly it won’t, and this leads to a further ‘exchange’ chapter as Chalmers attempts to defend his position.

The book is well structured, with a good index of terms and people. Searle always clearly defines his objections to ideas, however it becomes steadily more problematic for the reader to distinguish between the Searle’s version of, say, Dennett and Dennett’s ideas themselves. Importantly though, this book demonstrates some key problems surrounding not only the idea of consciousness specifically, but the ways in which we are inclined to think. The book contains a clear account of the commonly used thought experiment ‘the Chinese Room’ as well as clear explanations of key theories in the debate – from Dualism to Functionalism, taking in outright denial en route.

The fact remains that the debate over consciousness will not be resolved quickly and quietly. Searle adds more to the fervor of the debate with his no-nonsense approach to ideas which do not suit him. Bearing this in mind, a reader must be on her guard. Searle does not fall foul of direct misinterpretation, but in some places the simplifications miss important features and corollaries of the original texts. It is from these sections that direct debate has formed. The text remains a useful starting point for the issue at hand, showing the spectrum of ideas on the subject. As a tool for further reading and insight into some of the basic concepts under discussion in the wider arena The Mystery of Consciousness is invaluable. Be warned, however, the style is compelling and swift – and along with it come simplifications that inspire reference to the original texts for more advanced understanding.